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Abstract
We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators
and defectors on the evolutionary graph. Using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing
such arrangements of any number of mutants, we provide results for weak selection to favor cooperation
over defection on any regular graph with N ≤ 14 vertices. Furthermore, the properties of graphs that
particularly promote cooperation are analyzed. It is shown that the number of graph cycles of certain
length is a good predictor for the values of the structure coefficient, and thus a tendency to favor cooper-
ation. Another property of particularly cooperation–promoting regular graphs with a low degree is that
they are structured to have blocks with clusters of mutants that are connected by cut vertices and/or
hinge vertices.
1 Introduction
Describing conditions for the emergence of cooperation in structured populations is a fundamental problem
in evolutionary game theory [4, 19, 20, 35]. In structured populations the network describing which players
interact with each other may be crucial for the fixation of a strategy. Recently, several attempts have been
made to explore the universe of interaction graphs in order to link graph properties to fixation. For a single
cooperator this question has been studied intensively and recently relationships have been mapped for a large
variety of different interaction graphs connecting which strategy is favored with the fixation probabilities
and the fixation times [2, 18, 25, 32]. These results clarify for a single mutant the relationships between the
graph structure, on the one hand, and fixation probability and fixation time, on the other. The main findings
are that generally fixation probability and fixation time is correlated such that a higher fixation probability
comes with a higher fixation time. Within this general rule, it has further been shown that generalized
stars maximize fixation probability while minimizing fixation time, while comet–kites minimize fixation
probability while maximizing fixation time [18]. Furthermore, if we allow self loops and weighted links, we
may construct arbitrarily strong amplifiers of selection [25]. Compared with these findings, the problem of
multiple cooperators (or more than one mutant) is far less studied. One approach uses configurations and
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structure coefficients [6] and has shown that cooperation is favored over defection under conditions which
can be linked to spectral graphs measures and cooperator path length [27, 28].
This study deals with strategy selection for multiple mutants on evolutionary graphs and addresses two
central questions. The first is to find out which interaction network modeled as a regular graph yields the
largest structure coefficient and therefore is most suited to promote the evolution of cooperation. This
is reported for all regular graphs with N ≤ 14 vertices (= players). This question is studied subject to
three parameters, the number of players, coplayers and cooperators. Answering this question may inform
designing interaction networks with prescribed abilities to promote or suppress cooperation. As there are
some trends over varying these three parameters, it appears possible to conjecture for beyond the considered
parameters. The second question studied takes up the observation that there are differences in the values of
the structure coefficients over regular interaction graphs and asks what makes some graphs different from
others in terms of promoting the evolution of cooperation. Our main interest is what these differences
are from a graph–theoretical point of view. This goes along with identifying certain properties of regular
cooperation–promoting graphs. The main result is that the number of graph cycles of certain length is a good
predictor of a large value of the structure coefficient. Especially for a smaller number of coplayers graphs
that particularly promote cooperation have rather cycles with small length. Furthermore, these graphs are
structured to have blocks that are connected by cut vertices and/or hinge vertices. Cooperators cluster
on these blocks and serve as a mutant family that may invade the remaining graph. The study presented
here uses structure coefficients, which have been derived for birth–death and death–birth processes [6].
However, as the structure coefficients solely depend on the distribution of cooperators and defectors on
the evolutionary graph, they could be, at least in principle, also calculated for other strategy updating
processes as long as these processes are not completely random. Thus, the methodology reported here is
also applicable for other types of non–imitative dynamics.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2 the main results are given. In particular, upper and
lower bounds on the structure coefficients are presented for all interaction networks modelled as regular
graphs with N ≤ 14 players. Furthermore, it is shown that between maximal structure coefficients (and
thus conditions favoring the prevalence of cooperation) and the count of cycles with certain length, there
is an approximately linear relationship. The results are discussed in Sec. 3, while the Appendices review
the methodological framework of configurations, regular graphs and structure coefficients, discuss graph
isomorphism, and give a collection of graphs with maximal structure coefficients.
2 Evolution of Cooperation
2.1 Upper and lower bounds on the structure coefficients
The structure coefficient σ(pi,G) introduced by Chen et al. [6] (see [27, 28] for further analysis) is a measure
of whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in games with any arrangement of cooperators
and defectors on regular evolutionary graphs. More strictly speaking, in an evolutionary game with weak
selection and a payoff matrix (4), the fixation probability of cooperation is larger than the fixation probability
of defection if σ(pi,G)(a−d) > (c− b), see also Appendix 1. This condition connects the values of the payoff
matrix, the structure of the evolutionary graph G and the arrangement of cooperators and defectors on this
graph expressed by the configuration pi with long–term prevalence of cooperation. The structure coefficient
σ(pi,G) generalizes the structure coefficient σ introduced by Tarnita et al. [31] which yields the same condition
for favoring cooperation, σ(a − d) > (c − b), but applies to a single cooperator (or a single mutant). By
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Figure 1: The maximal structure coefficient σmax and the maximal difference ∆σ = σmax − σmin over the
number of players N and coplayers k for all regular interaction graphs with 6 ≤ N ≤ 14 and 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 3
according to Tab. 2.
contrast, σ(pi,G) is valid for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph and
specifically for several cooperators (or multiple mutants).
As the structure coefficient varies over configurations pi and graphs G, it is natural to ask about upper
and lower bounds of σ(pi,G). In this paper, we approach this question by checking all σ(pi,G), which
appears feasible for a small number of players N ≤ 14 and all regular graphs with up to 14 vertices. We
classify the structure coefficients and graphs with respect to the number of players N . Furthermore, the
configurations pi are also grouped according to the number of cooperators c(pi), 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 2, while
the graphs G are sorted according to the number of coplayers k (which equals the degree of the graph). As
the structure coefficients σ(pi,G) vary over configurations and graphs G, we may define two bounds. A first
is over all 2N − 2 non–absorbing configurations, which we call σmaxi . Thus, we obtain for each graph Gi,
i = 1, 2, . . .Lk(N), the quantity σmaxi = maxpi σ(pi,Gi). A second bound, called σmax, is derived from the
first bound and additionally collects over all Lk(N) regular graphs with a given N and k according to Tab.
2. Thus, we get σmax = max
i
σmaxi . For the minimum, the bounds are defined like–wise.
Fig. 1 shows the maximal structure coefficient σmax and the maximal difference ∆σ = σmax−σmin over
players N and coplayers k. As discussed in Appendix 2 these results apply to any instance of a regular
graph, for example to random regular graphs. It can be seen that the maximal structure coefficient σmax is
largest for k = 3, which is cubic graphs. For k > 3, the values of σmax get gradually smaller. In other words,
the more coplayers there are, the smaller is σmax. Also, for a constant number of coplayers, σmax increases
with N , which is the number of players. The increase, however, gets gradually smaller and converges for
N →∞ to a constant, which is σ(pi,G)→ σ = (k+ 1)/(k− 1) [6, 21]. For instance, for k = 3, the structure
coefficients converge to σ(pi,G) → σ = 2. In other words, for the thermodynamic limit with an infinite
population, prevalence of cooperation only depends on the number of coplayers k of a regular graph, but not
on the graph structure or the number and arrangement of cooperators on the graph. The largest difference
between maximal and minimal structure coefficient ∆σ = σmax − σmin we also get for k = 3. Here, ∆σ
increase to a largest values (for instance for k = 3 this happens for N = 10) before falling for N getting
even larger, converging to ∆σ = 0 for N →∞.
We next analyze the maximal structure coefficients depending on the number of cooperators c(pi). Thus,
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(a) N = 12 (b) N = 12
(c) N = 14 (d) N = 14
Figure 2: The maximal structure coefficient σmax and the maximal difference ∆σ = σmax − σmin over the
number of coplayers k and cooperators c(pi) for all regular interaction graphs with N = 12 and N = 14
according to Tab. 2.
the maximum is over all #c(pi) =
(
N
c(pi)
)
configurations with the same number of cooperators 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N−2
and all regular graphs according to Tab. 2. The maximal values of σmax and ∆σ are obtained for c(pi) = N/2
for N even and for both (N+1)/2 and (N−1)/2 for N odd. An exception is N = 12 and k = 3, where σmax
is obtained for c(pi) = 5 and c(pi) = 7. Furthermore, we get the following results, see Fig. 2 as examples
for N = 12 and N = 14. The value σmax and ∆σ are symmetric with the number of cooperators c(pi) and
generally higher for the number of cooperators and defectors exactly or approximately the same than for a
small number of cooperators or a small number of defectors. For the number of coplayers k getting larger,
the differences over the number of cooperators c(pi) for both σmax and ∆σ are levelled.
Apart from the numerical values of the maximal structure coefficients σmax and their relations to the
number of players N , coplayers k and cooperators c(pi), it is also interesting to know for which of the
Lk(N) graphs the maximal values occurs. We call the graphs for which this happens the σmax–graphs.
Their number is #σmax . Tab. 1 give the number of σmax–graphs, #σmax , for all N and k considered
here, see also Appendix 3 for some examples of σmax–graphs. If we compare these numbers with the total
number Lk(N) of k–regular graphs on N vertices, see Tab. 2, we observe that Lk(N) grows much faster
than #σmax . In other words, the σmax–graphs become rare as N increases. Fig. 3 shows the quantity
#log = − 1N2 log
(
#σmax
(4k−1/4k2)Lk(N)
)
over N and k (Fig. 3a), and over c(pi) and k for N = 14 (Fig. 3b). We
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(a) (b) N = 14
Figure 3: The quantity #log = − 1N2 log
(
#σmax
(4k−1/4k2)Lk(N)
)
relating the number of σmax–graphs, #σmax , to
the number of regular graphs Lk(N) for players N , coplayers k and cooperators c(pi)
Table 1: The numbers #σmax of graphs with maximal σmax for all regular graphs with Lk(N) > 1 and
6 ≤ N ≤ 14.
k \ N 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
3 1 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 10
4 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 10 14
5 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1
6 0 0 0 3 2 5 1 2 1
7 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 1
8 0 0 0 0 0 5 6 49 4
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 14
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 14
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
may conclude that as a rough approximation the ratio #σmaxLk(N) falls exponentially in N and polynomially in
k for k ≈ N/2 and N getting larger. Furthermore, observe from Fig. 3b that for small and large values of
the number of cooperators c(pi) there is a larger number of graphs that are σmax–graphs. The σmax–graphs
become rarer for c(pi) ≈ N/2, for which but σmax is largest.
2.2 Relationships between structure coefficients and graph cycles
Recently, Giscard et al. [7] proposed an algorithm to count efficiently the number of cycles with length `
in a graph: C`(N, k) with 3 ≤ ` ≤ N . Thus, it is feasible to count C`(N, k) for all Lk(N) regular graphs
with N ≤ 14, as given in Tab. 2. As an example see Fig. 7 with the count C`(6, 3), ` = {3, 4, 5, 6}, for the
L3(6) = 2 graphs with N = 6 and k = 3. The following discussion is based on taking into account these
numerical results.
In the previous section, it was shown that the maximal structure coefficients vary over interaction
networks modelled as regular graphs, even if the number of players, coplayers and cooperators is constant.
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(a)
(b) N = 12 (c) N = 14
Figure 4: Residual error res according to Eq. (1) over N , k and c(pi).
Thus, it appears reasonable to assume that some features of the graphs may be associated with these
differences. In the following, results are presented in support for an approximately linear relationship
between the number of graph cycles with certain length and the maximal structure coefficients. Two
previous results can be interpreted as to point at the validity of such a relationship between the number
of graph cycles and fixation properties. A first is from evolutionary games on lattice grids [8, 9, 14, 23].
For these games, it has been shown that clusters of cooperators have a higher fixation probability than
cooperators that are widely distributed on the grid. The location of the cluster on the grid does not
matter. As lattice grids can be described by regular graphs (a Von Neumann neighborhood is a 4–regular
graph, a Moore neighborhood a 8–regular graph) clusters imply short and closed paths between the nodes
of the grid. Furthermore, the grid means an abundance of cycles with even cycle length. A second result
is that between the structure coefficients and the path length between the cooperators there is a strong
negative correlation [28]. Cooperator path length is defined as the path length averaged over all pairs of
cooperators on the evolutionary graph. If there are more than two cooperators, the cooperator path length
has particularly small values if the cooperators cluster next to each other and are linked by loops. Thus,
small values of the cooperator path length correspond with the abundance of cycles of certain length.
As there are Lk(N) regular graphs for a given N and k, we obtain Lk(N) maximal structure coefficients
σmaxi , i = 1, 2, . . .Lk(N) together with the same count of cycle length C`i(N, k). Thus, we may assume for
each i a linear relationship σmaxi = C`i(N, k)x + i for some variables x with an error term i. To test the
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(a) N = 12, k = 3 (b) N = 12, k = 8
(c) N = 14, k = 3 (d) N = 14, k = 10
Figure 5: Examples of schemaballs of σmax–graphs.
validity of this linear relationship, we calculate the residual error
res =
1
Lk(N)‖C`x
∗ − σmax‖, (1)
where C` comprises of all Lk(N) cycle length C`i(N, k) and σmax contains all Lk(N) structure coefficients
σmaxi for a given N and k. The variable x
∗ is the solution of the non–negative least square problem
x∗ = arg min
x
‖C`x− σmax‖. (2)
As the length of x∗ varies with varying Lk(N), the residual error in (1) is weighted by Lk(N) to make it
comparable over all N and k. Note that the residual error (1) gives equivalent results to the root–mean–
square deviation, which is also sometimes used to measure the accuracy of a (linear) model. The results
are given in Fig. 4. We see that the residual error res is small for all 6 ≤ N ≤ 14, 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 3 and
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(a) N = 12, k = 3 (b) N = 12, k = 8
(c) N = 14, k = 3 (d) N = 14, k = 10
Figure 6: Examples of schemaball of σmin–graphs.
gets even smaller for N getting larger. Generally, the error res is slightly larger for k = 3 and k = N − 3
than for intermediate values of k. This is also true for calculating res for each number of cooperators c(pi),
see Figs. 4b and 4c, which show the results for N = 12 and N = 14. For N = 14 the values of res are
generally smaller than for N = 12 and the largest values of res are obtained for small and large k for all
c(pi). To conclude we can observe that the results for the residual error res are generally very small, which is
equivalent to saying that the error term i in the assumed linear relationship σmaxi = C`i(N, k)x+ i has an
expected value E(i) ≈ 0. Thus, there is some justification to observe that between the maximal structure
coefficients σmaxi and the cycle count C`i(N, k) there is an approximately linear relationship.
Finally, another aspect of the interplay between graph structure and fixation properties should be high-
lighted. To begin with, we analyze the cycle count C`(N, k) of σmax–graphs, which are those graphs among
the Lk(N) regular graphs that have maximal structure coefficients. Consider the example N = 12 and
k = 3. There are L3(12) = 85 graphs of which #σmax = 4 are σmax–graphs, compare Tab. 1 with Tab. 2.
For these 4 graphs we analyze how the count C`(12, 3) is distributed over ` = 3, 4, . . . , 12. A possible way
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to visualize such an analysis is based on schemaballs [13, 27], see Fig. 5a. In such a schemaball we draw
Bezier curves connecting the count C`(N, k) in the upper half of the ball with the associated cycle length `
in the lower half. The actual values of both ` and C`(N, k) are written on the ball. The curves are colored
in such a way that equal values of the cycle length ` have the same (and specific) color, no matter to which
cycle count C`(N, k) they are belonging. The colors are selected equidistant from a RGB color wheel. If
there are several σmax–graphs, as there are #σmax = 4 for N = 12, k = 3 in Fig. 5a, each graph has its
own set of curves between ` and C`. The schemaball thus contains all of them, which means there may be
curves between the same value of ` and several C` (and vice versa). For instance, in Fig. 5a showing the
schemaball for N = 12 and k = 3, we see that for ` = 3, which is cycles of length 3, also known as triangle,
we find connection to C3(13, 3) = (2, 3, 4, 5). This means each of the #σmax = 4 graphs has triangle, one has
2 of them, another one has 3, still another one has 4 and the final one has 5 triangle.
From the visualization using a schemaball it can be immediately seen that for N = 12 and k = 3 small
cycles lengths, that is ` = {3, 4, . . . , 7}, have generally a count C`(12, 3) > 0. For large cycle lengths, that
is ` = {8, 9, . . . , 12}, we have C`(12, 3) = 0. For N = 14 and k = 3, see Fig. 5c, we get very similar results.
By contrast, for larger k, not only the cycle count C`(N, k) is much higher than for lower k, but also the
distribution over cycles lengths ` is quite different, see the examples N = 12, k = 8, Fig. 5b and N = 14,
k = 10, Fig. 5d. Here, small as well as large cycle lengths ` have a substantial count C`(N, k). Moreover,
every cycles length ` is connected to a distinct interval of C`(N, k). This means that the σmax–graphs have
very similar counts C`(N, k) for each `. These properties becomes even more clear if we additionally consider
the schemaballs for σmin–graphs, which are the graphs with minimal structure coefficients see Fig. 6 for
the same examples as Fig. 5. Not only there are more σmin–graphs than σmax–graphs, (for instance 77 vs.
4 for N = 12, k = 3, or 359 vs. 6 for N = 12, k = 8), the balls for small k look very different, compare
Figs. 6a and 6c with Figs. 5a and 5c. For the σmin–graphs and small k even large cycle length ` have a
substantial count C`(N, k). The count is actually much higher, which means that σmin–graphs have generally
more cycles of a given length than σmax–graphs. On the other hand, for large k the differences are rather
marginal. The only difference is that the schemaballs are more dense, which means that σmin–graphs have
more different counts for a given cycle length than σmax–graphs. For the other tested number of players
N ≤ 14 similar results are obtained as shown in Figs. 5 and 6. We next discuss some implications of these
results on the evolution of cooperation on regular evolutionary graphs.
3 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper structure coefficients σ(pi,G) introduced by Chen et al. [6] (see [27, 28] for further analysis) are
studied for all regular interaction graphs with N ≤ 14 players and 3 ≤ k ≤ N −3 coplayers. These structure
coefficients provide a simple condition connecting long–term prevalence of cooperation with the values of
the payoff matrix (4), the structure of the evolutionary graph G and the arrangement of any number of
cooperators and defectors on this graph, which is expressed by the configuration pi. Cooperation is favored
for weak selection and a configuration pi on a graph G if
σ(pi,G) > c− b
a− d. (3)
For σ(pi,G) < 1, the game favors the evolution of spite, which can be seen as a sharp opposite to cooperation.
For σ(pi,G) = 1, the condition (3) matches the standard condition of risk–dominance. For σ(pi,G) > 1, the
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diagonal elements of the payoff matrix (4), a and d, are more critical than the off–diagonal elements, b and
c, for determining which strategy is favored. For instance, cooperation can be favored in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, which is specified by c > a > d > b. The condition (3) implies that a larger value of σ(pi,G)
still allows cooperation to emerge if a− d is small (or c− b is large). For the Stag Hunt game (Coordination
game), characterized by a > c ≥ d > b, the condition σ(pi,G) > 1 means to favor a Pareto–efficient strategy
(a > d) over a risk–dominant strategy (a + b < c + d). Again, a larger value of σ(pi,G) tolerates a smaller
Pareto–efficiency a − d. Put differently, cooperation is favored even if the difference between reward and
punishment is rather low. A generalization of these discussions can be achieved by the universal scaling
approach for payoff matrices that facilitates studying a continuum of social dilemmas [34]. According to
this approach a larger value of σ(pi,G) implies a larger section of the parameter space spanned by gamble–
intending and risk–averting dilemma strength [29]. Based on this interpretation of the structure coefficient
σ(pi,G), we review the following major results of the numerical experiments presented in Sec. 2.
a. There is an approximately linear relationship between maximal structure coefficients and the count
of cycles of the interaction graph with certain length. Moreover, the number of σmax–graphs grows
much slower for a rising number of players than the number of k–regular graphs on N vertices. Thus,
graphs with maximal structure coefficients get rare for the number of players N getting large.
b. The values of the structure coefficients are larger for a small number of coplayers, that is for graphs with
a small degree, and maximal for k = 3, which is cubic graphs, than for larger numbers of coplayers. This
is also the case for the largest differance between maximal and minimal structure coefficients. Thus, for
regular evolutionary graphs describing the interactions between players, the results for N ≤ 14 players
suggest that a smaller number of coplayers is particularly prone to promote cooperation if a favorable
graph is selected. The selection of graphs does matter less for a larger number of coplayers. The
σmax–graphs with small numbers of coplayers k not only have largest maximal structure coefficients,
they are also characterized by the absence of cycles with a length above a certain limit, see examples
in the collection of σmax–graphs in Appendix 3.
c. There are not only no long cycles in σmax–graphs with small k. The graphs are also structured
into blocks that are connected by cut vertices and/or hinge vertices. A cut vertex is a vertex whose
removal disconnects the graph, while a hinge vertex is a vertex whose removal makes the distance
longer between at least two other vertices of the graphs [5, 11]. For instance, for N = 12 and k = 3,
the vertices occupied by the players I3 and I9, see Fig. 11, are cut vertices, while for N = 10 and k = 4,
see Fig. 10b, the vertices occupied by the players I5 and I6 are hinge vertices as their removal would
make the distance between I4 and I7 longer. The blocks are occupied by clusters of cooperators. The
clusters can be seen as to serve as a mutant family that invades the remaining graph. As vertices with
players of opposing strategies are connected by cut and/or hinge vertices there is only a small number
of (or even just a single) migration path for the cooperators and/or defectors. A similar observation
has been reported for evolutionary games on lattices grids [8, 14], see also the discussion in Sec. 2.2.
To summarize: the results suggest that σmax–graphs for small numbers of coplayers have some distinct
graph–theoretical properties. Searching for these properties in a given graph may inform the design
of interactions graphs that are either particularly prone to cooperation or particularly opposed to it.
d. The property of missing long cycles is also a possible explanation as to why regular graphs with
small degree differ substantially from graphs with larger degree in terms of promoting cooperation in
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evolutionary games. A larger degree makes it impossible to have blocks that are connected by only a
few edges. As the number of edges increases linearly with the degree by kN/2 and each vertex has the
same number of edges, there is an ample supply on connections. These results imply that connectivity
properties of the interaction graph play an important role in the emergence of cooperation. It may be
interesting to see if these connectivity issues may possibly also show in algebraic graph measures, for
instance algebraic connectivity expressed by the Fiedler vector.
The results given above show a clear dependency between the long–term prevalence of cooperation in evo-
lutionary games on regular graphs and some of their graph–theoretical properties, which generally confirm
previous findings on clusters of cooperators in games on lattice grids [8, 9, 14, 23], on pairs of mutants on
a circle graph (k = 2) [36], and on short cooperator path lengths on some selected regular graphs with
N = 12 and k = 3, among them the Frucht, the Tietze and the Franklin graph [28]. However, apart from
statements about the prevalence of cooperation there are also other quantifiers of evolutionary dynamics
that are highly relevant. In other words, some of the difficulty in the given approach for evaluating the
emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games on graphs arises from structure coefficients merely treating
a comparison of fixation probabilities. The condition indicates that the fixation probability of cooperation is
higher than the fixation probability of defection. This, however, does not entail the values of these probabili-
ties. However, structure coefficients can be calculated with polynomial time complexity [6], while computing
fixation probabilities is generally intractable due to an exponential time complexity [10, 12, 33]. In other
words, by using the approach involving structure coefficients, we exchange computational tractability by
obtaining just a comparison of fixation probabilities instead of their exact values. Moreover, apart from
the difference in the information obtained, the variety in the descriptive power of the structure coefficients
as compared to the fixation probabilities is salient in another way. Most likely, there is a rather complex
relationship between structure coefficients and fixation probability, which is illustrated by the example of a
single cooperator for which the structure coefficient does precisely not imply unique values of the fixation
probability of cooperation. For a single cooperator we get a single value of the structure coefficient, but
fixation probabilities vary over initial configurations as shown for the Frucht and for the Tietze graph [16].
All these considerations show that calculating fixation probabilities and fixation times for multiple mutant
configurations is not only computationally expensive, but also has a huge number of possible setups, for
instance, which one of the considerable number of graphs to analyze, or where to place cooperators on the
evolutionary graph and how many. There are various experimental parameters to be taken into account,
which might be why so far systematically conducted numerical studies are sparse. In this sense, another
contribution of this paper might be seen in pointing at settings for numerical experiments calculating fixation
probabilities and fixation times. The results given in this paper show that among all the regular interaction
graphs with N ≤ 14 players and 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 3 coplayers, there is a comparably small number of graphs
(as given in Tab. 1) which favor cooperation more than others. It may be interesting to see if these graphs
also stand out in terms of fixation probability and fixation time as compared to a graph randomly drawn
from the other ones.
Acknowledgments:
I wish to thank Markus Meringer for making available the genreg software [17] used for generating the
regular graphs according to Tab. 2 and for helpful discussions.
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Appendix A Configurations, regular graphs and structure coefficients
The co–evolutionary games we consider here have N players I = {Ii}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , that each uses either
of two strategies pii ∈ {C,D}, which we may interpret as cooperating or defecting. Each player Ii, which
interacts with a coplayer Ij , receives payoff according to the 2× 2 payoff matrix
(i \ j C D
C a b
D c d
)
. (4)
Which player interacts with whom is described by the interaction graph G = (V,E), where the vertices
vi ∈ V represent the players and the edges eij ∈ E indicate that the players Ii and Ij interact as mutual
coplayers [15, 22, 26]. Which strategy is used by which player at a given point of time is specified by a
configuration pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN ) with pii ∈ {C,D}. If we represent the two strategies by a binary code
{C,D} → {1, 0}, a configuration appears as a binary string the Hamming weight of which denotes the
number of cooperators c(pi). For games with N players, there are 2N configurations with 2 configurations
(pi = (00 . . . 0) and pi = (11 . . . 1)) absorbing. Players may update their strategies in an updating process,
for instance death–birth (DB) or birth–death (BD) updating [1, 24]. Recently, it was shown by Chen et
al. [6] that strategy pii = 1 = C is favored over pii = 0 = D if
σ(pi,G)(a− d) > (c− b). (5)
This results applies to weak selection and 2× 2 games with N players, payoff matrix (4), any configuration
pi of cooperators and defectors and for any interaction network modeled by a simple, connected, k–regular
graph.
The quantity σ(pi,G) in Eq. (5) is the structure coefficient of the configuration pi and the graph G.
It may not have the same value for different arrangements of cooperators and defectors described by the
configuration pi and also for different interaction networks modeled by a regular graph G. In particular, it
was shown that for weak selection and the graph G describing interaction as well as replacement graph, the
structure coefficient σ(pi,G) can be calculated with time complexity O(k2N) for DB and BD updating [6].
For DB updating there is
σ(pi,G) = N (1 + 1/k)ω
1 · ω0 − 2ω10 − ω1ω0
N (1− 1/k)ω1 · ω0 + ω1ω0 , (6)
with 4 local frequencies (ω1, ω0, ω10 and ω1ω0), which depend on pi and G, see [6, 27, 28] for a probabilistic
interpretation of these frequencies. Our focus here is on DB updating as it has been shown that BD updating
never favors cooperation [6].
Appendix B Isomorphic graphs, isomorphic configurations and cycle counts
The structure coefficient σ(pi,G), as for instance defined for DB updating by Eq. (6), may vary over
configurations pi and graphs G. This suggests the question of upper and lower bounds of σ(pi,G). For a
rather low number of players it appears feasible to check all σ(pi,G), as demonstrated in the paper for N ≤ 14
and all regular graphs with up to 14 vertices. For a 2 × 2 game with N players, there are 2N − 2 non–
absorbing configurations pi. These configurations can be grouped according to the number of cooperators
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Table 2: The numbers Lk(N) of simple connected k–regular graphs on N vertices, [17], which corresponds to
the number of regular interaction graphs with N players and k coplayers for 6 ≤ N ≤ 14 and 3 ≤ k ≤ N−1.
Note that there is more than one graph, Lk(N) > 1, only for k ≤ N − 3.
k \ N 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
3 2 0 5 0 19 0 85 0 509
4 1 2 6 16 59 265 1.544 10.778 88.168
5 1 0 3 0 60 0 7.848 0 3.459.383
6 0 1 1 4 21 266 7.849 367.860 21.609.300
7 0 0 1 0 5 0 1.547 0 21.609.301
8 0 0 0 1 1 6 94 10.786 3.459.386
9 0 0 0 0 1 0 9 0 88.193
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 10 540
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 13
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
c(pi), 2 ≤ c(pi) ≤ N − 2. The number of simple, connected regular graphs is known for small numbers of
vertices, e.g. [17], see Tab. 2. Note that these numbers apply to graphs that are all not isomorphic with each
isomorphism class being represented by exactly one graph. In other words, Tab. 2 also gives the number of
isomorphism classes for all 6 ≤ N ≤ 14 and 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. Isomorphism refers to the property that two
graphs are structurally alike and merely differ in how the vertices and edges are named. More precisely, two
graphs are isomorphic if there is a bijective mapping θ between their vertices which preserves adjacency [3],
pp. 12–14.
Consider, for example, the L3(6) = 2 interaction graphs with N = 6 players, each with k = 3 coplayers,
see Fig. 7. For the graph in Fig. 7a we get the maximal structure coefficient σmax = 1.1818 for 2 configu-
rations, pi = (111000) as shown in Fig. 7a and pi = (000111). By the isomorphism θ =
( v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
1 2 3 4 5 6
6 1 2 3 4 5
)
,
we obtain an isomorphic graph as shown in Fig. 7b. For this graph, the configuration pi = (111000) has
σ = 1.0000, but pi = (110001) and pi = (001110) have σmax = 1.1818. Note that between the configurations
with σmax the same isomorphic mapping θ applies. In other words, the structure coefficients are invariant
under isomorphic mappings. For each pair of isomorphic graphs, there are isomorphic configurations that
have the same value of the structure coefficient. For the graph in Fig. 7c, we obtain the result that the struc-
ture coefficient is constant over all configurations (except the absorbing configurations). Thus, isomorphic
transformations do not alter the values of σ(pi,G).
These results apply generally to structure coefficients σ(pi,G) of regular graphs. The local frequencies in
Eq. (6) solely depend on counting two types of paths on the interaction graph [6, 27, 28]. The quantities
ω1, ω0 and ω1ω0 relate to the number of paths with length 1 that connect any vertex with adjacent vertices
that hold a cooperator (or defector). The quantity ω10 relates to the number of paths with length 2 from
any vertex to adjacent vertices on which the first vertex of the path holds a cooperator and the second
vertex holds a defector. As an isomorphic reshuffling of vertices preserves adjacency, these numbers stay
the same if the isomorphism acts on both the vertices and the configurations. Thus, suppose two graphs
Gi and Gj are isomorphic with isomorphism θ. Then, it follows σ(pi,Gi) = σ(θ(pi),Gj). Furthermore,
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Figure 7: The L3(6) = 2 interaction graphs with N = 6 players, each with k = 3 coplayers. All are vertex–transitive
and (c) is even symmetric (edge–transitive). The graph in (a) has a maximal structure coefficient σmax = 1.1818, which
is obtained for two configurations with c(pi) = 3 cooperators: pi = (111000) (as shown in (a)) and pi = (000111). For
the isomorphic graph in (b), we get σmax = 1.1818 for the isomorphic configurations pi = (110001) and pi = (001110).
The graph in (c) has the same structure coefficient σ = 1.0000 for all configurations. Regarding the count of cycles
with length `, we see that the graphs in (a) and (b) have C`1(6, 3) = (2, 3, 6, 2), while for the graph in (c) there is
C`2(6, 3) = (0, 9, 0, 6).
the maximal structure coefficient is invariant as well, that is for isomorphic graphs Gi and Gj there is
σmaxi = maxpi
σ(pi,Gi) = σmaxj = maxpi σ(pi,Gj). Any regular graph belongs to one of the isomorphism
classes and can be obtained by isomorphic transformations by any member of this class. Regular interaction
graphs that are isomorphic have the same distribution of structure coefficients σ(pi,G) over the number of
cooperators c(pi). Thus, by considering one representative of each isomorphism class, we can make statements
about structure coefficients for all regular graphs.
For each graph, there is a specific count C`(N, k) of cycles with length `, 3 ≤ ` ≤ N . There are efficient
algorithms to count these cycles [7]. Consider again the L3(6) = 2 graphs with N = 6 players and k = 3
coplayers, see Fig. 7. We find the graph in Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b has C`1(6, 3) = (2, 3, 6, 2) with ` = {3, 4, 5, 6}
(there are 2 cycles of length ` = 3, 3 cycles of length ` = 4, 6 cycles of length ` = 5 and so on), while
the graph in Fig. 7c has C`2(6, 3) = (0, 9, 0, 6). It generally applies that isomorphic graphs have the same
C`(N, k). Graphs that are not isomorphic have frequently a distinct count C`(N, k), but there are also cases,
particularly for N getting larger, where 2 not isomorphic graphs have the same count C`(N, k).
Appendix C Collection of σmax–graphs with N ≤ 14
We here give a collection of selected σmax–graphs with N ≤ 14. The graphs are shown to illustrate some
graph–theoretical properties associated with prevalence of cooperation. The single σmax–graph with N = 6
is already shown in Fig. 7a. For N = 7, there are L4(7) = 2 regular graph, which both have the same
maximal structure coefficients. In other words, the count of graphs equals the count of σmax–graph, which
is why they are not included in the collection.
Figs. 8–10 shown all σmax–graphs for N = 8, 9, 10 and 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 3 together with σmax and the
associated configurations. For N = 12 and N = 14, only some examples of σmax–graphs are given in Figs.
11–13 due to brevity. A full list of all σmax–graphs for 11 ≤ N ≤ 14 and 3 ≤ k ≤ N − 3 is made available
here [30]. It is particularly noticeable that the σmax–graphs are structured to have blocks with clusters of
mutants. For instance, we see such a block with (I1, I2, I3, I4) for the graph with N = 8 and k = 3 in
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Figure 8: The σmax–graphs for N = 8 and k = 3, 4, 5. We get σmax = 1.6538 for k = 3, (a), σmax = 1.2222 for
k = 2, (b), and σmax = 0.9565 for the 2 σmax–graphs with k = 5, (c),(d), each for the configuration pi = (1111 0000).
In addition, the same structure coefficient is obtained also for the configuration pi = (0000 1111), and only for (d)
additionally for pi = (1100 0011) and pi = (0011 1100).
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Figure 9: The σmax–graphs for N = 9 and k = 4, 6. We get σmax = 1.3206 for k = 4 (a) and the configuration
pi = (11110 0000), but also for pi = (11111 0000), pi = (00000 1111) and pi = (00001 1111). For k = 6, there are 3
σmax–graphs, (b),(c),(d), each with σmax = 0.9115 for the configuration pi = (11110 0000). There are several more
configurations that have the same σmax due to the symmetry properties of these 3 graphs.
Fig. 8a and for N = 9 and k = 4 in Fig. 9a, or for N = 10 and k = 3, Fig. 10a and for the cubic graphs
(k = 3) with N = 12 and N = 14 as well, see Figs. 11 and 13. The σmax–graphs with larger degree (=
coplayers) still somewhat retains such a “blockish” appearance (for instance (I1, I2, I3, I4, I5) in Fig. 10c)
but to a far lesser degree. In addition, σmax–graphs with larger degree are frequently vertex–transitive (for
instance Figs. 9d, 10e and 10g) which is not the case for cubic (k = 3) and quartic (k = 4) σmax–graphs
with N ≤ 14, with the exception of N = 6 and k = 3, see Fig. 7a. Furthermore, it can be observed that the
blocks are occupied by clusters of cooperators which are frequently connected by cut vertices and/or hinge
vertices. For instance, for N = 12 and k = 3, the vertices occupied by the players I3 and I9, see Fig. 11,
are cut vertices, while for N = 10 and k = 4, see Fig. 10b, the vertices occupied by the players I5 and I6
are hinge vertices as their removal would make the distance between I4 and I7 longer. As discussed above,
the clusters can be seen as to serve as a mutant family that invades the remaining graph. As vertices with
players of opposing strategies are connected by cut and/or hinge vertices there is only a small number of
(or even just a single) migration path for the cooperators and/or defectors.
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Figure 10: The σmax–graphs for N = 10 and k = 3, 4, . . . , 7. We get σmax = 1.8831 for k = 3 (a), σmax = 1.5128
for k = 4 (b), σmax = 1.2222 for k = 5 (c), σmax = 1.0241 for k = 6 (d),(e) and σmax = 0.9145 for k = 7 (f),(g), all
for the configuration pi = (11111 00000), and also for pi = (00000 11111). For one graph with k = 7,(f) the maximal
structure coefficient is also obtained for 2 more configurations.
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